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Abstract - This article provides a discussion supported 
on the review of the recent literature that analyses the 
relationship between board’s attributes and the 
company performance. Furthermore, we discuss the 
methodology used and identify its limitations. Finally, 
we present some problems to solve these limitations and 
show other interesting topics for future research. 
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1. Introduction 
The beginning of the twenty-first century started with 
some scandals in important world companies, like the 
examples of Enron and WorldCom, among many 
other situations. In general, the stock prices of these 
companies were very high and suddenly they have 
fallen down. 
As said by Berk & DeMarzo (2007) the reasons 
behind these bankruptcies are associated with fraud 
that derived from the manipulation of accounting 
statements. These situations impose some questions 
like the following one: Why the board of directors 
did not do anything? 
Good governance increases the value of the firm. 
However, bad governance has a high opportunity 
cost.  
Corporate governance is the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled in order to 
prevent fraud. At the same time, this topic is about 
possible conflicts of interests between the different 
stakeholders of a company. One of the most known 
conflicts of interests is between the managers and the 
investors which result from the separation between 
ownership and control. 
In order to align these interests, some types of 
incentives exist for cases of good behavior and 
punishments for the cases of bad behavior. The 
owning of stocks of the company is an example of 
incentive. The fire of a manager for poor performance 
can be presented as an example of punishment.  
According to Berk & DeMarzo (2007) there are three 
types of directors: inside, gray and outside. Inside 
directors are for example the employees who have a 
direct relationship with the firm. Gray directors are 
for example the bankers who have a business 
relationship with the firm. Finally, outside directors 
are all the other directors. 
One topic that is frequently studied by researchers is 
related with the study of the best type of directors. 
Weisbach (1988) study proved that there is a more 
powerful relationship between prior performances 
and the probability of managers to be fired if the 
board is composed in majority by outside directors. 
However, this topic is very complex and very 
difficult to explain because there are a lot of other 
aspects that may affect the performance of the 
companies. 
Another topic that is very commonly analyzed about 
boards is the influence of their size on the company’s 
performance. Yermack (1996) argued that board size 
is inversely related with firm value. He used a sample 
of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations to prove 
that. 
2. Board of Directors’ Theoretical 
Perspectives 
In general, there are four main views related to the 
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(Zahra & Pearce II (1989)):  
 legalistic perspective,  
 resource dependence,  
 class hegemony, 
 agency theory. 
These perspectives have a lot of differences among 
them, for example in terms of the board 
characteristics that can influence the company 
performance. Moreover, every perspective considers 
a different role taken by the board. Even the 
theoretical origins are very distinct. For example, the 
agency theory derives from the area of economics 
and finance and the “legalistic perspective” proceeds 
from corporate law. 
The first perspective - the legalistic - says that boards 
can influence the performance of the companies by 
doing their legally mandated responsabilities.  This 
theory says that the board is responsible for selecting 
the CEO and monitoring its own performance. In this 
perspective, there is no interference by the board in 
the day-to-day operations. Related to the attributes 
that are relevant to the director’s performance, this 
perspective emphasizes four attributes: board 
composition, characteristics, structure and process. 
The second perspective - “resource dependence” - 
argues that the board can help the firm regarding its 
general environment. According to Zahra & Pearce II 
(1989), this approach also takes into consideration the 
fact that boards can provide favorable 
interorganizational relationships. Moreover, this 
perspective includes another aspect: the strategy, 
which gives a wider view compared to the legalistic 
perspective.  
Thirdly, there is the perspective related to “class 
hegemony” that in general is closer to the Marxist 
sociology. This perspective claims that boards are a 
way to keep the actual capitalist elite power. At the 
same time, according to this perspective, the CEO has 
much power and it can minimize the power of the 
board. 
Finally, the agency theory perspective considers the 
board as the ultimate system of corporate control. 
This theory considers that with too much liberty the 
executives will have an incentive to pursue their own 
objectives, which can be different from the objectives 
of the shareholders.  
One important difference between agency theorists 
and class hegemony academics is that the first uses in 
general market measures and the second uses mainly 
accounting measures. 
3. The Board’s Attributes and Their 
Influence in the Company 
Performance 
Taking into consideration the four theoretical 
perspectives analysed before there are four main 
board attributes that influence the company 
performance:   
 composition,  
 characteristics,  
 structure, 
 process. 
As said by Zahra & Pearce II (1989) these four 
attributes are tremendously correlated and do not 
show the entire picture about the boards of directors. 
However, these four attributes represent an important 
part of the research that is made about the 
relationship between the boards and the company 
performance. 
According to Zahra & Pearce II (1989) the board 
composition attribute incorporates the different types 
of directors and the size of the board. In the case of 
characteristics, they integrate the director’s 
background and its personality. Thirdly, the board 
structure attribute consider for example the types of 
committees and the sharing of information among 
them. Finally, the process attribute is about the ways 
the board makes its deliberations. 
Accordingly, the objective of this research is to 
discuss the recent literature developments in terms of 
the relationship between the boards of director’s 
attributes and the company performance. 
In order to achieve this objective a group of well-
known literature databases was used in order to find 
the most relevant articles, namely: Web of Science, 
Scopus, B-on and Proquest. The results obtained 
present 15 articles of major interest to analyse and to 
discuss. 
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The analysis among the various articles involved the 
comparison of the following aspects (table 1):   
dimensions that are analyzed, organization 
performance criteria, control variables, sample, 
analytical approaches and major findings. 
In terms of the dimensions that are analyzed (table 1), 
most of the articles try to explain the impact of board 
size in the company performance (in this case 12 of 
the total number of articles). The second most 
analysed dimension is the board composition (with 6 
articles). Other topic of greater attention is the board 
independence (with a total of 5 articles). 
Now considering the organization performance 
criteria (dependent variable) the most commonly used 
measure is the ROA (return on assets) that appears in 
7 articles. Others commonly used measures of 
performance are ROE and Tobin’s Q. 
In the majority of the cases the analytical approach 
that is used is the regression complemented with 
Pearson correlations. However, there are some 
articles that use more powerful methods, such as two-
stage least square or generalized method of moments. 
With the application of the regression most of the 
authors choose to include control variables in the 
regression model. The majority decided to control the 
size of the firm using the natural log of assets. Some 
had used a ratio to control the effect of leverage 
dividing the total debt by the total assets. 
 
In terms of the sample used in the studies the 
majority of the authors appealed to companies from a 
single country and that were publicly listed.  
Furthermore, the major findings showed that smaller 
boards and more independent boards are in general 
good for the company’s performance. However, we 
need to be aware that not all the articles achieve these 
results, what means that there are contradictions 
when the results are compared. 
4. Discussion 
As is common with the majority of the empirical 
studies in corporate governance there are several 
econometric problems.  The most relevant problems 
were identified by Bӧrsch-Supan & Kӧke (2002) as 
follows: endogenous variables considered wrongly as 
exogenous variables; the use of a convenience 
sample; some of the variables have large errors and 
some of the databases have a lot of errors. 
Firstly, in order to avoid the problem of endogeneity 
Bӧrsch-Supan & Kӧke (2002) recommend to use 
panel data and at the same time to take into 
consideration the unobserved firm characteristics. 
Regardless, to the articles analyzed not all had used 
panel data what can be a problem in order to validate 
the results. Moreover, not all had considered in 
careful way the unobserved part of the model. 
Secondly, the sample selection bias also occurs in the 
majority of the articles, because the samples were 
composed only by listed companies. We have to 
remember that in most of the cases the listed 
companies have good performances which will affect 
the dependent variable of the model, normally a 
measure of performance. 
Thirdly, Bӧrsch-Supan & Kӧke (2002) suggest that 
all the studies should include data about shareholder 
type, debt structure, composition, market power and 
takeover activity. The analysis of the literature 
showed that the majority of the regressions do not 
include the market power neither the takeover activity 
factors. The other three were in general included in 
the models. 
Our analysis also detected that a great part of the 
studies involved data from a single country 
confirming the scarcity of multi-country level studies. 
Moreover, there is an excessive focus in the analysis 
of the effects of the board’s characteristics in 
company performance when compared to the studies 
that analyze the influence of board’s member’s 
characteristics in the company performance. 
5. Avenues for Future Research 
The analysis of the recent empirical studies about the 
relationship between the board’s attributes and the 
company performance showed that some of the 
typical problems remained. So, it is clear that in the 
future the researchers need to be more careful about 
the inclusion of the necessary control variables in 
order to have good estimation results. 
Moreover, it is necessary to produce wider studies 
which may include various countries in the analysis. 
We have for example the recent article from Black, 
de Carvalho, Khanna, Kim, & Yurtoglu (2013) that 
shed some light on this issue. 
The choice of the dependent variable has shown also 
several limitations and the use of accounting 
measures of performance or the use of market 
measures of performance do not guarantee reasonable 
results. So, it is necessary to combine different types 
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of performance measures in order to obtain better 
results.  
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Table 1. Board Attributes and Corporate Financial Performance 
Study 
(Year) 
Dimensions  Performance 
Criteria  











ROA Lagged ROA 
Age of the firm  
Log (assets) 
Debt / equity ratio 
Board age 
Group affiliated company dummy 
Board education level 
Board average age 
Board size 







Firm value is positively 
influenced by a 
moderate level of 
board network density. 
Firm performance is 
positively affected by 












average of RoA, 
return on sales (RoS) 
and return on equity 
(RoE)) 
Adjusted Tobin’s Q 
(ratio of market value 
of equity to the book 
value of debt) 
Dummy variables to control for firm ownership 
(public versus private) 
Logarithm of size of board of directors  
Logarithm of total assets netted for depreciation 
Cash flows divided by total assets 
Logarithm of number of years since incorporation 
Leverage = (total assets – equity capital) / total assets 
Percentage share price change 
Dummy variable indicating uncertainty in the 
economic environment  
127 listed 
manufacturing firms in 
India for 2003 
(classified in nine 
industries). 
Regression Larger boards tend to 
diminish the firm 
performance. 
Positive effect between 
the number of non-
executive directors and 
firm performance. 
The compensation of 
the CEO has a relevant 








Table 1. Board Attributes and Corporate Financial Performance (continued) 
 Study 
(Year) 












Net interest margin 
ROA 
ROE 
Efficiency ratio  







The results obtained 
contradict the hypotheses 
elaborated under the agency 
theory. 







CSP Score (retrieved from the Canadian 
Social Investment Database) 
EPS 
ROE 
Log of total 
assets 
104 Canadian firms Regression 
Pearson 
correlation 
Board independence is 
positively associated with 
social performance but 
shareholder orientation is not. 
Exists a positive relationship 
between social performance 
and financial performance. 










Financial Q (Sum of market capitalization 
plus long and short-term debt over the book 
value of total assets) 
RET (The one-year raw stock market return.) 
Proportion of the 
company owned 
by the directors 
 
44 Irish non-financial 
firms with significant 
data listed on the Irish 





Board size shows a relevant 
negative relationship with 
firm performance 
For the case of smaller firms 
the relationship between 
board size and firm 
performance is less negative 
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CEOs’ education levels 














performance is positively 













ratio as the 
proxy for 
Tobin’s Q 
Lag value of Tobin’s Q 
Natural logarithm of the total value 
of assets 













of the Generalized 
Method of 
Moments (GMM) 
Smaller and more independent 
boards do not conduce to better 
firm performance 
In the case of nonfounder-led 
family firm the performance is 
positively affected by the board 
size. 
For the case of founder-led 
family businesses the board has 






Duality of the Chairman’s role and 
the Chief Executive Officer’s role 
Multiple directorial positions 
Managerial ownership 
Share price – 
closing share 
price of the 
stock at the 




Log of the company’s total assets 
Total liabilities divided by total 
assets 
Length of time that an entity’s 
shares have been traded in the 
Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) 









The firm performance is 
positively influenced by the 
managerial ownership. 
 




Table 1. Board Attributes and Corporate Financial Performance (continued) 
Study 
(Year) 
Dimensions  Performance 
Criteria  










Board leadership structure 
Market-to-





by the book 
value of 
equity. 
Natural logarithm of the book 
value of total assets. 
Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Ratio of net working capital to the 
book value of assets. 












Presence of endogeneity plus a 
two-way causality in the case 
of ownership variables and 
market to book performance. 
Ghabayen 
(2012) 
Audit committee size 
















Regression Firm performance is not 
affected by audit committee 
size, audit committee 










Audit committee size 
Board size 
Board composition 
ROA Natural log of total assets 











Firm performance is negatively 
influenced by the effects of 
CEO tenure and leverage. 
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Independent board composition  
Board fees 
Chairman duality 





after taxes to 
total assets 
(EBEIAT) 
Natural log of total assets 
Dummy variable that takes in 
consideration the differences of 
the financial industry when 
comparing to the others sectors. 










The economic period affect the 




















The firm ROE is positively 
affected by the board size and 
ethnic diversity. Board 
independence affects 











Audit committee independence 
Audit committee activity 
Audit committee size 
Tobin’s q The book value of the total assets 
of the company. 
The percentage of total liabilities 













In general the results 
contradict the agency theory 
which emphasizes that boards 
of directors tend to diminish 
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Table 1. Board Attributes and Corporate Financial Performance (continued) 
Study 
(Year) 












Operating income minus 
operating expenses/total 
assets 
Problem loans/total loans 
Natural log of total 
problems loans 
Net charge-offs/total loans 
Natural log of (gross 
charge-offs minus 
recoveries) 
Net charge-offs/total loans 
Natural log of (gross 
charge-offs minus 
recoveries) 
Natural log of total assets 
Total loans/total assets 
Equity/total assets 
Dummy variable equal 1 if a bank has been 
listed at the end of the year and 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable equal 1 if a bank has been 
listed at the end of the year and 0 otherwise 
Percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders if the largest shareholder is 
government or government agency 
Percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders if the largest shareholder is a 
foreign investor 
Percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders if the largest shareholder is a 
private investor 
Herfindahl index of shareholdings of the 
second to tenth largest shareholders 
Natural log of weighted average GDP per 







Bank performance is positively 
influenced by the ratio of 
independent directors. 
Bank performance is 
negatively influenced by the 
board size. 
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Finally, no one of the classical corporate governance 
theories fully explains the major issues involved in 
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